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Constitutional Law-EQUAL PROTECTION-STATUTE DISTINGUISHING
BETWEEN TYPES OF ESTABLISHMENTS IN WHICH BILLIARD TABLES ARE
LOCATED HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL-Rollins v. State, 354 So. 2d 61
(Fla. 1978).
Leon James Rollins owns and operates an establishment in
Miami, Florida, known as South Florida Billiards. On September
1, 1976, Rollins was arrested for allowing minors in his billiards
establishment in violation of section 849.06, Florida Statutes,'
which makes it unlawful to permit anyone under the age of eighteen
to visit, frequent or play in any billiard parlor in the state.
Rollins filed a motion to dismiss in the Dade County Court, argu-
ing that the statute was arbitrary and discriminatory upon its face
and violative of equal protection.' Upon denial of the motion, he
pleaded nolo contendere, specifically reserving his right to appeal. 3
The court accepted the plea and fined Rollins fifty dollars.4 On a
direct appeal, 5 the Florida Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the lower court and held that the statute contravened the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section
2 of the Florida Constitution.'
I. THE DECISION
Section 849.06 of the Florida Statutes is divided into four subsec-
tions.7 Subsection (1) prohibits persons from allowing minors to
either visit or play in any billiards establishment. Excepted from
this provision are military personnel, married minors, minors whose
parent or guardian has filed a signed and notarized permit with a
specific billiards establishment, and minors accompanied by a par-
ent or guardian. No such written permit is valid in any establish-
ment where alcoholic beverages are sold or consumed. 8
1. (1977).
2. Rollins v. State, 354 So. 2d 61, 62 (Fla. 1978).
3. FLA. R. App. P. 9.140 (b) (1). See also State v. Ashby, 245 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1971).
4. 354 So. 2d at 63.
5. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3 (b) (1).
6. 354 So. 2d 61.
The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
states that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
Article I, § 2 of the Florida Constitution states:
Basic rights-All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable
rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue
happiness, to be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property
.... No person shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion or physical
handicap.
7. (1977).
8. FLA. STAT. § 849.06(1) (1977) provides:
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The second subsection of the statute excludes bowling establish-
ments of at least twelve lanes from the proscriptions of subsection
(1).1 Subsection (3) provides for the development of parental ap-
proval forms, 0 and subsection (4) makes violation of the statute a
first degree misdemeanor." Rollins did not contest the validity of
subsections (1), (3), or (4), but rather argued that the exemption for
bowling alleys established in subsection (2) was arbitrary and de-
prived him of equal protection under the law. 2
In examining the constitutionality of the statute, the Florida Su-
preme Court focused on the reasonableness of the classification. 13
Relying on two decisions by the United States Supreme Court,
McLaughlin v. Florida' and Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia,"' the
court stated a general rule: "For a statutory classification to satisfy
the equal protection clauses found in our organic documents, it
must rest on some difference that bears a just and reasonable rela-
tion to the statute in respect to which the classification is pro-
posed."'" In applying this rule to the billiards statute, the court
chose two Florida cases, Moore v. Thompson 7 and Mikell v.
Henderson, as examples of statutory classifications that bore no
such reasonable relation. 9
It is unlawful for any person, his servant or employee to permit anyone under the
age of 18 years to visit or frequent or play in any billiard parlor in the state;
provided, however, this shall not apply to any person on active duty in the Armed
Services of the United States, or who has a written permit or card signed and
notarized by his parent or guardian and filed in the establishment to which the
permit or card is given by the parent or guardian of the minor involved, or a married
minor, or when accompanied by parent or guardian. The said permit card shall be
valid only in the establishment to which it is issued, and such permit card may be
revoked at any time by the parent or guardian, or by the operator of said billiard
parlor by returning the card to the parent or guardian, or by any law enforcement
officer upon conviction of the party or parties of a crime. No written permit shall
be valid in any establishment which sells or permits consumption on its premises
of intoxicating or alcoholic beverages.
9. Id. § 849.06(2) provides: "Persons playing billiards in bona fide bowling establishments
and persons frequenting such establishments are exempt from the provisions contained in
subsection (1). For the purposes of this section a 'bona fide bowling establishment' shall be
one consisting of 12 lanes or more."
10. Id. § 849.06(3) provides: "The Division of Beverage of the Department of Business
Regulation shall be responsible for developing and issuing the parental approval permit
prescribed in subsection (1)."
11. Id. § 849.06(4) provides: "Violation of this law shall be a misdemeanor of the first
degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083."
12. Brief of Appellant at 5.
13. 354 So. 2d at 63.
14. 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
15. 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
16. 354 So. 2d at 63.
17. 126 So. 2d 543 (Fla. 1960).
18. 63 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1953).
19. 354 So. 2d at 63-64.
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Moore v. Thompson involved a Sunday closing law which applied
only to used car dealers.20 In Moore, the Florida Supreme Court held
that the " 'valid and substantial reason' yardstick" had not been
met because there was no sufficient reason for the law to apply to
some, and not all, businesses.2 1 The court reasoned that there must
be some rational basis for treating used car dealers differently from
other businesses in order for the legislature to subject only the used
car dealers to a statutory restriction.2
The facts in Mikell v. Henderson make that case particularly
relevant to Rollins. In Mikell, the validity of a cruelty to animals
statute which forbade the raising, training, or fighting of gamecocks
was challenged. 23 These statutory proscriptions, however, did not
apply to cockfights on steamboats or other craft. Plaintiffs were
gamecock breeders who conducted cockfights on land to determine
the strongest birds for breeding purposes. In their request for a
declaratory judgment, they argued that the different statutory
treatment accorded to cockfighting on water craft violated the con-
stitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws.
The Florida Supreme Court agreed, noting that if a person's
gamecocks happened to get into a fight on land, the breeder would
be subject to arrest for cruelty to animals, but that same person
would be within the law if the same cockfight occurred on any type
of craft on the waters.2 4 The court held that the statute violated both
the federal and the Florida equal protection clauses because there
was no reasonable basis for the difference in classification between
cockfights on land and cockfights on water. 25
The Rollins court felt that there was no difference between play-
ing billiards in a billiards establishment or in a bowling alley suffi-
cient to justify a special classification. As Justice Alan Sundberg
observed for the Rollins court, "[j]ust as there is no difference
between the fighting of roosters on a steamboat and the fighting of
roosters on land, there is no rational distinction between playing
billiards in a billiard parlor or shooting pool in a bowling alley. ' 26
The court noted that many bowling alleys serve alcoholic beverages.
As written, the statute allowed minors to frequent bowling alleys
20. Ch. 59-295, 1959 Fla. Laws 1005 (repealed 1977).
21. 126 So. 2d at 551.
22. Id. at 549. Decisions are split on Sunday closing laws which apply only to billiards
establishments. See e.g., State v. Greenwood, 187 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1972) (ordinance held
unconstitutional); Wilder v. State, 207 S.E.2d 38 (Ga. 1974) (statute held constitutional).
23. FA. STAT. §§ 828.02, .12, .15 (1977).
24. 63 So. 2d at 509.
25. Id.
26. 354 So. 2d at 64.
1979]
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containing pool rooms and bars but prohibited minors from entering
"dry" billiards establishments. This hardly achieved the supposed
statutory intent to protect minors from unsavory influences, as un-
desirables were as likely to patronize the former as they were the
latter.Y
To the state's argument that the legislature had concluded that
minors should be protected from the likelihood of encountering
gambling in billiards establishments, the court replied that such a
conclusion was indeterminate at best and that statutory classifica-
tions had to rest on clearly enunciated purposes, not judicial hy-
potheses.2' Courts will not countenance speculative probing when
dealing with statutory classifications.2 ' Moreover, as the court
pointed out, the fact that some minors were allowed into these es-
tablishments by virtue of the exceptions enumerated in the statute
itself belied the ostensible intent of the legislature. The court rea-
soned that since the legislature was surely as concerned for the
welfare of minors with parental consent as it was for minors in
general, this concern could not have been the rationale behind the
statute." Accordingly, the court declared section 849.06 of the Flor-
ida Statutes invalid as a violation of appellant's right to equal pro-
tection under the law.3 1
11. THE STATUTE
The history of section 849.06 of the Florida Statutes, and a discus-
sion of other relevant Florida statutes, may provide some insight
into the political and philosophical bases underlying the statute.
The basic prohibition was enacted in 1913 when all minors were
forbidden admittance to all billiards establishments.2 In 1963, the
legislature recast the statute in basically the same form as the pres-
ent subsection (1).3 The new statute provided for minors' admitt-
ance to billiard parlors with written parental consent and allowed
parents to designate which particular establishment their children
27. Id. at 63.
28. Id. at 64.
29. Id. (citing McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973)). In McGinnis, the Court held
that a rational basis existed for § 230(3) of the New York Correction Law, which denied good-
time credit toward parole eligibility for state prisoners' presentence county jail incarceration,
but provided good-time credit for prisoners released on bail prior to sentencing, so that equal
protection was not denied.
30. 354 So. 2d at 64.
31. Id.
32. Ch. 6489, § 1, 1913 Fla. Laws 310. There are no reported decisions challenging the
statute in this form.
33. Ch. 63-303, §§ 1-2, 1963 Fla. Laws 836.
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could attend.34 The statute remained basically the same35 until 1974
when subsection (2) was added, excluding bowling alleys from the
proscriptions of subsection (1).31
While gambling per se is not prohibited by the Florida Constitu-
tion, 7 it is regulated extensively by the legislature. For example, the
keeping of gambling houses is punishable as a felony, 38 and, it is a
misdemeanor for the licensed operator of a billiard table to permit
gambling on any form of billiards.39 Another section of the chapter
on gambling specifies that: "whoever plays or engages in any game
at cards, keno, roulette, faro, or other game of chance, at any place,
by any device whatever, . . .shall be guilty of a misdemeanor
... .,,0 Yet another statute provides that a proprietor, owner or
keeper of an establishment kept for the purpose of betting who
willfully and knowingly permits a minor to gamble in the establish-
ment is guilty of a felony."
All gambling, however, is not proscribed. Charitable, nonprofit
organizations are allowed to conduct bingo games, with some limita-
tions,42 and twenty-three recognized gambling games are allowed at
public fairs and expositions, again with various limitations.43
II. OTHER STATES' STATUTES
Most states have a statute addressed to the issue of minors in
billiards establishments. Although these statutes are varied, there
are five basic methods by which states treat this issue: (1) eleven
states bar minors from all billiards establishments;" (2) fourteen
34. Id.
35. The age of majority was reduced from 21 to 18 in Florida in 1973. This was applied
prospectively to all relevant statutes. Ch. 73-21, 1973 Fla. Laws 59 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
743.07 (1977)).
36. Ch. 74-97, 1974 Fla. Laws 132. The bill was introduced into the senate on April 19,
1974, as SB 727. The house amended and passed it on May 16, 1974. FLA. H. R. JOUR. 736,
737 (Reg. Sess. 1974). It passed the senate, with amendments, on May 17, 1974. FLA. S. JOUR.
428 (Reg. Sess. 1974). It became law without the Governor's signature on May 29, 1974. FLA.
S. JOUR. 636 (Reg. Sess. 1974).
37. Lamkin v. Faircloth, 204 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). FLA. CONST. art.
X, § 7 provides: "Lotteries, other than the types of pari-mutual pools authorized by law as
of the effective date of this constitution, are hereby prohibited in this state."
38. FLA. STAT. § 849.01 (1977).
39. Id. § 849.07.
40. Id. § 849.08.
41. Id. § 849.04.
42. Id. § 849.093.
43. Id. § 616.091.
44. Alabama, ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 6-10 (1975); California, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 273(f), 336
(West 1970) (taken together, these two sections appear to effectuate the same purposes);
Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 18-1203 (1948) (repealed); Iowa, IowA CODE ANN. § 726.9 (West 1950);
Mississippi, Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-5-11 (1972); Montana, MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-1002
19791
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states allow admittance of minors only with some form of parental
consent; 5 (3) eight states expressly leave the decision to the discre-
tion of local governments;" (4) seven states have repealed previously
enacted statutes; 7 and (5) nine states have no statute on this sub-
ject. 8
Two states, Mississippi" and South Carolina, 50 make a classifica-
tion similar to that made by Florida's section 849.06, distinguishing
between establishments in which billiards is the "primary" or
"principal" business and those where billiards is not the major
source of revenue-in other words, bowling alleys containing billiard
rooms.
The Mississippi statute strictly forbids minors' admittance to bil-
liards establishments. Rather than expressly excepting bowling al-
leys from the proscriptions, Mississippi defines a billiards establish-
ment as a business where billiards is the "primary" activity or
where revenues from billiards constitute fifteen percent of the busi-
ness receipts.
(1949); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:5-3 (West 1976); Pennsylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7105 (Purdon 1973); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-2-13 (1976); Washington, WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.28.080 (1977); Wyoming, Wyo. STAT. § 33-6-108 (1977).
45. Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-281 (West 1960); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. §
84-1611 (1975); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 25-445-52 (1976); Kentucky, Kv. REV. STAT. §
436.320 (1975); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 8, § 3 (1964) (if a parent objects, no minors
admitted); Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 140, § 179 (West 1974); Missouri, Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 318.090 (Vernon 1963); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-20-6 (1975); New
York, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 260.20 (McKinney 1967); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-317
(1969) (if a parent objects, no minors admitted); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1103
(West 1958); South Carolina, S.C. CODE § 52-11-130 (1976); South Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 26-10-8 (1978) (consent is required when low point beer is available on the premises);
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-1006 (1975).
46. Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 24, § 11-42-2 (Smith-Hurd 1962); Michigan, MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.141 (1978); Nebraska, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 14-102 (1977); Nevada, NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 244.345, 269.170(1)(a)(s) (1973); New Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286:6
(1977); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-40 (1973); Virginia, VA. CODE § 18.2-432 (1975); Wiscon-
sin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 60.29(15) (West 1957).
47. Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 84-2501, -2519 (1960) (allowed with consent-repealed
by 1971 Ark. Acts, no. 648, § 1); Indiana, IND. CODE §§ 35-1-104, 113-115 (1971) (no minors
allowed in divers places, including billiards establishments-amended in 1973 to delete bil-
liards establishments from the proscriptions-repealed by 1976 Ind. Acts, P.L. 148, § 24);
Louisiana, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14.283 (West 1974) (no minors allowed-repealed by 1972
La. Acts, no. 155, § 1); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 617.61-63 (West 1964) (no minors
allowed-repealed by 1963 Minn. Laws, ch. 753, art. II, § 17); North Dakota, N.D. CENT.
CODE § 53-05-08 (1974) (no minors allowed-repealed by 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws, ch. 402, § 1);
Texas, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 653 (Vernon Appendix 1974) (regulation was left to
local governments-repealed by 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 65, § 3); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 31, § 510 (1970) (allowed with consent-repealed by 1959 Vt. Acts, no. 262, § 37).
48. Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Maryland, Ohio, Oregon, and West
Virginia.
49. Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-5-11 (1972).
50. S.C. CODE § 52-11-130 (1976).
1979]
The South Carolina statute varies from the Mississippi statute in
that minors are allowed into billiards establishments if they are
accompanied by their parents or have written consent. Although the
statute itself does not include a classification similar to Florida's
and Mississippi's, the South Carolina Supreme Court appears to
have engrafted such a classification on the statute. 1 The court im-
plied that the statute applies only to establishments where billiards
is the "principal" business.5 1
The result of the Mississippi and South Carolina classifications
is the same as that of section 849.06 of the Florida Statutes: minors
may be admitted to bowling establishments which contain pool
rooms but not to "pure" billiards establishments.5 3 There is no re-
ported litigation on either the Mississippi or South Carolina statute.
There is, however, no real difference between these statutes and the
Florida statute which was stricken in Rollins. Given the reasoning
of the Florida court, the Mississippi and South Carolina statutes
also should be held unconstitutional.
IV. CONCLUSION
The court's decision in Rollins v. State is just and rational. Ini-
tially, it might appear that playing billiards in a billiards establish-
ment is different in fact from playing billiards in a bowling alley.
And courts do not require that things different in fact be treated in
law as though they were the same.54 Nonetheless, even if playing
billiards in billiards parlors and in bowling alleys were sufficiently
different to justify different treatment by the courts, equal protec-
tion requires that differences resulting in legislative classifications
must relate to the matter to be regulated.55 This was not the case
in Rollins.
The only necessary difference in playing billiards in the two dif-
ferent locations is just that - the location. In Mikell v. Henderson,
the court quite reasonably felt that a cockfight was a cockfight,
whether it occurred on land or water. Similarly, billiards is billiards,
whether played in a billiards establishment or bowling alley. Is there
any valid reason to believe that gambling is more prevalent in bil-
liards establishments, or that the atmosphere of a billiards estab-
lishment is somehow more conducive to disturbance? Are undesira-
51. Melody Music Co. v. McLeod, 151 S.E.2d 749 (S.C. 1966).
51. Id. at 751.
53. Presumably, few bowling alleys would be susceptible to a charge that billiards was
their primary or principal purpose, and it would be rare to find one in which billiards consti-
tuted more than fifteen percent of revenues.
54. Ridaught v. Division of Fla. Highway Patrol, 314 So. 2d 140 (Fla. 1975).
55. Harper v. Galloway, 51 So. 226 (Fla. 1910).
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ble characters more likely to frequent billiards establishments serv-
ing no alcohol than bowling alleys with pool rooms and bars? Which
is more deleterious, if at all, to the welfare of a minor, a pool room
in a bowling alley or a billiards establishment? In the absence of any
legislative answers for these questions, the Florida Supreme Court
logically concluded that neither is worse than the other.
Since there is no practical difference between playing billiards in
a billiards establishment or in a bowling alley, the court decided
that the classification could have no reasonable relation to the stat-
ute.5" In a case decided in 1965, the Florida Supreme Court quoted
from a 1913 Florida decision to the effect that: "[tihe inhibition
that no state shall deprive any person . . . of the equal protection
of the laws was designed to prevent any person, or class of persons,
from being singled out as a special subject for arbitrary and unjust
discrimination . . . ."I With this in mind, the court reasoned that
the statute in question created an arbitrary, unjust discrimination,
and so declared it unconstitutional.
Although Rollins contended that only the second subsection of
section 849.06 violated his constitutional rights, the Florida Su-
preme Court overturned the entire statute. Rollins had argued tan-
gentially that subsection (1) of the statute was anachronistic and
should, consequently, be stricken. 8 The court apparently agreed. It
most likely recognized the fact that times have changed, minors are
generally more sophisticated today than they were in 1913, and
billiards establishments are in many instances not the unwholesome
places they were at the turn of the century. It has been said that "a
statute which is valid when enacted may become invalid by changes
in the conditions to which it applies." 9 Perhaps the Rollins court
realized that this proposition applied to the regulation of billiards
and, consequently, concluded that the whole statute should be over-
turned.
WILLIAM TARR
56. 354 So. 2d at 63; see Davis v. Florida Power Co., 60 So. 759 (Fla. 1913); Jordan Chapel
Freewill Baptist Church v. Dade County, 334 So. 2d 661, 669 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
57. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d 39, 40 (Fla. 1965) (quoting
Davis v. Florida Power Co., 60 So. 759 (Fla. 1913)).
58. Brief of Appellant at 8-9.
59. Georgia S. & Fla. Ry., 175 So. 2d at 40.
